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RECENT CASES
flexibility that operate within specific agencies on the other. Perhaps the solu-
tion to the courts' dilemma lies not in an enumeration of circumstances in which
each procedure should be employed, but rather in a legislatively adopted proce-
dure similar to the hybrid rule making-adjudicatory procedure used by the
Board in Excelsior. Such a procedure could incorporate an opportunity for all
interested parties to be heard through amicus briefs, for notice and publication
features, deferred effectiveness of rules, and any other due process requirements
determined essential by Congress. Perhaps the Board in Excelsior, recognizing
that its function was best served by the hybrid procedure, was acting in good
faith. As long as the Board continues to act in good faith, maybe it should be
allowed, in Justice Douglas' words, "to have its cake and eat it too."
'62
FRANx A. VALENTI
CIVIL RIGHTS-PuBLIC AcCOMMODATIONS-REcREATIONAL FACILITY
HELD A COVEPED ESTABLISHMENT UNDER 1964 ACT
The petitioners, Negro residents of Arkansas, brought a class action seek-
ing injunctive relief1 under the public accommodation section of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,2 to restrain the respondent, owner and operator of the Lake Nixon
62. Instant case at 776.
1. Contrary to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, where civil damages were available, the
only remedy provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a
3 (1964).
2. The relevant provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000
et seq. (1964) are as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964). All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommoda-
tions of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1964). Each of the following establishments which serves the
public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its
operations affect commerce...
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other
facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises ... ;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or
other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment (A) . .. (ii) within the premises of which is physically
located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving
patrons of such covered establishment.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (1964). The operations of an establishment affect commerce
within the meaning of this title if . . . (2) in the case of an establishment de-
scribed in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), it serves or offers to serve interstate
travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves . ..has moved in
commerce; (3) in the case of an establshment described in paragraph (3) of
subsection (b), it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams,
exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce; and
(4) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) of subsection (b)
... there is physically located within its premises, an establishment the operations
of which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes
of this section, 'commerce' means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation,
or communication among the several states ....
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Club, from denying Negroes' admission to his facility. The Club is a privately-
owned recreational area, which has facilities for swimming, picnicking, boating,
miniature golf, and dancing. This 232 acre facility also contains a snack bar.
Located twelve miles west of Little Rock, the Club is not adjacent to any state
or federal highways. The facility was advertised once in a local magazine dis-
tributed in Little Rock, and once in a local armed force's newspaper. Numerous
radio announcements were broadcast to the "members" of the Club. In return
for a twenty-five cent "membership" fee, patrons were given cards which entitled
them to enter the premises for the entire recreation season. Upon payment of
additional fees, "members" were allowed to use Lake Nixon's recreational facil-
ities. Cards were available to virtually any white patron, but all Negroes were
refused membership. Although finding that Lake Nixon was not entitled to the
private club exemption3 provided in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the district court
dismissed petitioners' complaint,4 holding that neither the snack bar nor the
recreational facilities were within any category of public accommodation reg-
ulated under the Act.5 A divided Court of Appeals affirmed,6 holding that Lake
Nixon's facilities did not affect commerce.7 Certiorari was granted by the
United States Supreme Court.8 The Court, per Mr. Justice Brennan, in an eight
to one decision, reversed. Held, recreational facilities which solicit patrons from
an audience known to include interstate travelers, which contain eating facilities
that serve food that has moved in commerce, and which utilize recreational
equipment that has moved in commerce, are subject to the public accommoda-
tion section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298
(1969).
The first civil rights legislation attempting to prohibit discrimination in
public accommodations was the Civil Rights Act of 1875,9 which was based
upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 0 Its purpose
was to end discrimination in public carriers, public inns, and places of amuse-
ment which were operated by private proprietors. In 1883, the Supreme Court,
in the Civil Rights Cases, declared most of the Act unconstitutional." The
Court stated that the fourteenth amendment only prevented discrimination by
the state and was not designed to prevent discrimination by private citizens.'
2
3. An exemption is provided under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1964) for a facility which
is "not in fact open to the public." For a discussion of the private club exemption see
Note, 45 N.C. L. Rav. 498 (1967).
4. Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
5. Unless otherwise indicated, the word "Act" refers to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1964).
6. Daniel v. Paul, 395 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968).
7. Unless otherwise indicated, the word "commerce" refers to interstate commerce.
8. 393 U.S. 975 (1968).
9. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
10. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, see
Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875 and The Civil Rights Cases Revisited: State Action, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Housing, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 5 (1966).
11. 109 US. 3 (1883).
12. For a study of the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment and its relation
to public accommodations, see Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875: Some Reflected Light
374
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Therefore, insofar as the Civil Rights Act of 1875 applied to action by private
citizens, it was invalid. Following the Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases,
no major civil rights legislation was enacted by Congress for over seventy,
years.1
3
In the absence of federal legislation, the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment has been the only authority utilized to prevent dis-
crimination in public accommodations. Consequently, a showing that the dis-
crimination resulted from state action has been required in order to prove
unconstitutionality.' 4 Discrimination required by statute clearly constitutes suf-
ficient state action,'15 but state action need not be so obvious. Financial in-
volvement in the segregated facility,16 or support of the segregated facility
voiced by public officials' 7 has been considered sufficient. The limited avail-,
ability of the equal protection clause as a remedy for discrimination is illus-
trated in Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant,'8 where the court held
that a restaurant located on a public highway in Virginia could lawfully refuse
to serve Negroes. The court decided that the refusal did not violate the equal
protection clause because the discrimination was the result of local custom,
rather than state action. The court indicated that mere acquiescence by the
state in the actions of its citizens did not constitute state action within the
meaning of the amendment. 19
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was based not only on the equal protection
clause, but also on the 'commerce clause20 The right of Congress to use its
on the Fourteenth Amendment and Public Accommodations, 66 CoLum. L. Rav. 873 (1966).
For a contrasting interpretation, see Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State
Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 CoLuIS. L. Rv. 855 (1966) [herein-
after cited as Silard].
13. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245 (1964).
14. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); accord, Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
15. See, Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Gober v. City of
Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963); Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963).
16. See, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
17. See, Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
18. 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959).
19. This is not to say that the fourteenth amendment has never been utilized to prevent
discrimination in public accommodations. There was at least one successful case decided prior
to the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which was brought to compel the integration
of a public accommodation. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961),
involved a segregated restaurant located within a public parking facility owned and operated
by a city agency. The city benefited financially from the restaurant, and the Supreme Court
held that this financial benefit to the state was sufficient state involvement to constitute
"state action." Since the state had become a "joint participant in the, challenged activity,"
the discrimination practiced by the restaurant violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 725.
20. The majority in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States noted the existence
of a constitutional basis for Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in addition to the com-
merce clause:
The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress based the Act on § S and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its power to
regulate interstate commerce under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution.
*.. [However] since the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we
have considered it alone. 379 U.S. 241, at 249-50 (1964).
375
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power over commerce2 ' to reach desired social goals has been upheld by the
courts in other areas.2 2 For example, the Pure Food and Drug Act,28 although
passed pursuant to Congress' power to regulate commerce, did not have eco-
nomic regulation of the food and drug industries as its goal. The commerce
power was used as a means of achieving a social goal: the protection of the
health of the American people.
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination or segre-
gation on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin at certain
public accommodations. 24 There has been considerable litigation involving both
its constitutionality and its interpretation. In the first case decided by the
Supreme Court under the Act, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,2
the enforcement of the "motel provision"12 6 was attacked as unconstitutional.
The Court upheld the legislation citing the overwhelming evidence 27 that seg-
regated motel facilities affect commerce. The provision was distinguished from
the public accommodation section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which had
been held unconstitutional.28 First, the Court noted that Title II applied only
to four categories of public accommodations which affected commerce, whereas
the 1875 Act applied to all public accommodations. Next, while the Act of
1875 was based upon the fourteenth amendment, Title II was based on the
commerce clause, and the question of whether the 1875 Act could have been
sustained under the commerce clause had not been fully considered. Finally,
the Court stated that "the fact that certain kinds of businesses may not in
1875 have been sufficiently involved in interstate commerce to warrant bring-
ing them within the ambit of the commerce power is not necessarily dispositive
of the same question today.11
2 9
In Katzenbach v. McClung,"° the "restaurant provision" 3' of Title II was
The concurring Justices included the fourteenth amendment as an additional basis for their
decision. See note 53 infra.
21. "The Congress shall have Power ...to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes . ... U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
22. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913), which upheld the "White
Slave Act," 36 Stat. 825 (1910). For other cases upholding the right of Congress to legislate
against social and moral wrongs under the commerce clause, see cases cited in Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
23. The Pure Food and Drug Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) was sustained in Hipolite Egg
Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964).
25. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
26. "[Any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient
guests . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1) (1964).
27. The Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel cited the hearings of each house which showed
the burden that discrimination by motels and hotels placed on commerce. 379 U.S. at 252.
28. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
29. 379 U.S. at 251.
30. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(2) and (c)(2) (1964) provide:
[Alny restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises...
... [affects commerce if] ... it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or
a substantial portion of the food which it serves ...has moved in commerce.
376
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similarly upheld. A restaurant accused of discrimination obtained 46%o of the
food it served from a local supplier who procured the food from outside the
state. Although the owner made no attempt to solicit out of state partons, and
there was no proof that an interstate traveler was ever served at this restaurant,
the Court held that a restaurant sufficiently affects commerce if a substantial
portion of the food served has moved in commerce. Although "substantiality"
will depend upon the facts in each case, the Court concluded that 46% was
substantial. Since McClung, the "substantial portion" test has been further
refined. Courts have only required that "more than [a] minimal" quantity
move in commerce.32 Regardless of whether the "substantial portion test" is
met, coverage under the restaurant provision may rest upon a finding that the
facility offers to serve interstate travelersY
s
The "entertainment provision" 34 of Title II was interpreted by the court
of appeals in Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc.35 By applying 'ejusdem
generis to the phrase, "other place of . . entertainment," two district court
cases had restricted the accommodations covered under this section to include
only those providing passive, spectator-type sports.3 6 The Court in Miller,
however, accepted the dictionary definition of "entertainment," which includes
both passive and active sports.37 Under this definition, the Court held that an
amusement park is a "place of entertainment" under Title II. Under the last
category of public accommodation covered by the Act, the "included estab-
lishment,18 a business which might otherwise be exempt loses its exemption
if it is located within, or contains a Title II public accommodation.39
The initial issue faced by the Court in the instant case was whether Lake
Nixon was within the private club exemption of the Act. A finding that Lake
Nixon was a private club would have enabled it to continue its policy of racial
32. Gregory v. Meyer, 376 F.2d 509, 511 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967). See Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, pt. II,
at 1385-93 (1963). In the following cases, all percentages have been termed substantial:
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296 (1964) (46%); Gregory v. Meyer, supra at 511
(20-30%); Codogan v. Fox, 266 F. Supp. 866, 868 (M.D. Fla. 1967) (23-30%).
33. Gregory v. Meyer, 376 F.2d 509, 510 (5th Cir. 1967). In addition, no proof is
needed that an interstate traveler is actually served. An offer is sufficient. Wooten v. Moore,
400 F.2d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1968).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (3) and (c) (3) (1964) provide:
[A]ny motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other
place of exhibition or entertainment . . . [affects commerce if]
it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or
other sources of entertainment which move in commerce.
35. 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
36. Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises,
Inc., 259 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. La. 1966).
37. 394 F.2d at 351.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(4) provides:
[Any establishment (A) ... (ii) within the premises of which is physically located
any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons
of such covered establishment.
39. E.g., Fazzio Real Estate Co. v. Adams, 396 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Fraley, 282 F. Supp. 948 (M.D. N.C. 1968); Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc. 261 F.
Supp. 474 (EfD. Va. 1966).
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discrimination. 40 Although the respondents referred to their facility as a pri-
vate club and charged a nominal membership fee,41 the Court found that the
membership device was a sham, and looked instead to the business practices
of Lake Nixon. It found "none of the attributes of self-government and member-
ownership traditionally associated with private clubs."' 42
After deciding this initial question, the Court found that Lake Nixon's
snack bar was covered under the "restaurant provision" of Title II. To qualify
under this provision, the facility must have been principally engaged in the sale
of food.4 Without discussion, the Court stated: "Clearly, the snack bar [was]
'principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises.' ,44 This
finding did not, however, automatically make the snack bar subject to Title II.
The Court also had to decide whether the facility affected commerce. The
Court noted that "three of the four food items sold at the snack bar contain
ingredients originating outside of the State."45 Using the "substantial por-
tion test," the Court concluded that the food served had moved in commerce. 40
Although there was no proof in the record that any interstate traveler was
ever served at the snack bar, the advertisements for Lake Nixon had reached
an audience known to include interstate travelers.47 The Court found that
"[t]his choice of advertising media [left] no doubt that the Pauls were seek-
ing broad-based patronage from an audience they knew to include interstate
travelers.148 Since Lake Nixon, therefore, offered to serve interstate travelers,
and all patrons of Lake Nixon had access to the snack bar, the Court con-
cluded that the snack bar also offered to serve interstate travelers. Since its
operations affected commerce, the Court held that the snack bar was a place
of public accommodation. Next, the Court found that the entire Lake Nixon
facility was a public accommodation under the "included establishment pro-
vision," since the snack bar was covered under Title 11.49 Finally,50 the Court
40. An exemption to Title II is provided under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1964).
41. Respondents employed these devices after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, in order to qualify as a private club. Instant case at 301-02.
42. Instant case at 301. Characteristics of a private club include a membership com-
mittee, self-government, social, rather than profit-making objectives, and member-ownership.
43. The district court in the instant case held that the snack bar did not meet this
requirement and refused to consider the snack bar as a separate facility. 263 F. Supp. 412,
419 (1967). This is the only case which has considered an eating facility a "mere adjunct"
to the principal business involved. Contra, Fazzio Real Estate Co. v. Adams, 396 F.2d 146
(5th Cir. 1968) (bowling alley--eating facility); Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp.
474 (ED. Va. 1966) (golf course-eating facility).
44. Instant case at 304.
45. Id. at 305.
46. Id.
47. For example, the Lake Nixon Club was advertised once in Little Rock Today, a
monthly publication distributed free of charge by Little Rock's hotels, motels and restaurants
to guests and tourists. 263 F. Supp. at 417-18.
48. Instant case at 304.
49. Accord, Fazzio Real Estate Co. v. Adams, 396 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1968).
50. The Court could have ended the decision in the instant case with the finding that
Lake Nixon was an included establishment based upon the coverdge of the snack bar under
the Act. However, the respondents could have easily negated the effect of the decision by
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decided that Lake Nixon was also a public accommodation under the "enter-
tainment provision" of Title II, following Miller v. Amusement Enterprises,
Inc., which held that "entertainment" includes both passive and active activ-
ities.r" To qualify as a public accommodation, the place of entertainment must
present entertainment which moves in commerce. The Court cited the fact
that the Club leased fifteen paddle boats from an Oklahoma company, and
rented a juke box which was manufactured outside Arkansas.5 2 The concurring
opinion of Justice Douglas stressed the fourteenth amendment as an additional
ground for reversing the decision of the lower courts, 3 stating that racial seg-
regation "is a denial ... of the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment .... " Justice Black dissented on the ground that the conclusions
of the majority were not supported by facts in the record. He argued that the
1964 Civil Rights Act was based only upon the commerce power. Therefore,
reasoned Justice Black, the party seeking injunctive relief under the statute
had to prove the effect of the facility upon commerce, which the petitioners
had not done.
The Court's decision in the instant case, prohibiting discrimination at
Lake Nixon, resulted from a finding that Lake Nixon affected commerce. By
resting its decision only on the commerce power underpinnings of Title II,
the Court was forced to fit the facility into one of four possible statutory defi-
nitions, and then determine whether the requisite effect upon commerce existed.
This mechanical procedure impedes the full integration of public accommoda-
tions which do not affect commerce. The requirement of proof of the effect of
the facility upon commerce could have been avoided by basing the decision
upon the Civil Rights Act of 1866,r 5 following the reasoning of Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.,56 which held that private discrimination in the sale or
rental of property is barred by the 1866 Act. In addition to prohibiting racial
discrimination in private real estate transactions, the Act of 1866 provides
removing the snack bar and petitioner would then have had to bring another action based
on the entertainment grounds.
51. The decision in Miller occurred after the district court decision, but before the
court of appeals decision in the instant case. However, the court of appeals did not accept
the reasoning in Miller and instead adopted the lower court's definition of "entertainment,"
which included only passive sports. However, it could be argued that Lake Nixon qualifies
under both the passive and active definitions of entertainment. Passive entertainment in-
cluded listening to the juke box or to the live bands, and watching others dance. Participa-
tory (active) entertainment included playing miniature golf, swimming, dancing, and boating.
This point was barely discussed by the lower courts, and was not discussed by the Supreme
Court in the instant case.
52. Instant case at 308.
53. This concept is discussed in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 279, 291 (1964) (concurring opinions). For the legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment basis, see H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1963); S. Rep. No. 872,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1963). See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., supra,
at 292, 293 n.1 (concurring opinion).
54. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 260 (1964), quoted in Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298,
309 (1969).
55. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), recodified, in part, as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1964).
56. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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"that all persons ...shall have the same right, in every State and territory
in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens .... ,,57 Under common law, an entrance ticket to a place of
entertainment is a contract.5" Therefore, it may be argued that a refusal to
sell an entrance ticket to a black citizen is an interference with his right to
contract. Although this argument was presented before the Court in the in-
stant case, 9 the Court chose to base its decision upon the commerce power.
The significance of the decision, however, does not lie merely in the constitu-
tional basis used by the Court to prohibit segregation. Of even greater signifi-
cance is the minimal proof which the Court accepted as sufficient to show that
Lake Nixon affected commerce. The Court held that Lake Nixon's snack bar
affected commerce because a substantial portion of the food served had moved
in commerce. The only basis for this finding was judicial notice taken by the
district court judge.11 The Court's reliance on facts outside the record was
emphasized in Black's dissent. He discussed the willingness of the majority to
accept "assumptions," "probabilities," and "judicial notice," in place of evi-
dence and judicial findings.61 As a result of Daniel v. Paul, cases involving dis-
crimination in public accommodations may be brought where little proof of
the effect of the facility upon commerce exists. The minimal amount of proof
required in the Daniel case shows that the Supreme Court may well hold that
nearly all public accommodations are covered under the Civil Rights Act of
1964.62
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57. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
58. E.g., Williams v. Kansas City, 104 F. Supp. 848, 859 (W.D. Mo. 1952), aff'd,
205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953); Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey
Club, 86 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (W.D. Ark. 1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1950).
59. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969),
devotes approx. 50% of its length, and the Brief for Petitioner, Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S.
298 (1969), devotes approx. 25% of its length to the applicability of the Act of 1866.
60. The snack bar served four items: hamburgers, hot dogs, soft drinks, and milk.
Instant case at 305. Although there was no proof in the record concerning the sources of
the food, the district court took "judicial notice" that the wheat in the rolls was "produced
and processed" outside Arkansas. The court also stated that "certain ingredients" in the
soft drinks "were probably obtained ...from out-of-state sources." 263 F. Supp. at 418.
The Supreme Court used this information to state that "three of the four food items sold
at the snack bar containted] ingredients" that had moved in commerce. Instant case at 309.
61. Instant case at 310-13 (dissenting opinion).
62. The implications of the decision in Daniel are discussed by justice Black in the
dissent:
[The application of the 1964 Civil Rights] Act [to] this country people's recreation
center ...would be stretching the Commerce Clause so as to give the Federal
Government complete control over every little remote country place of recreation in
every nook and cranny of every precinct and county in every one of the 50 States.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 315.
